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Active ﬁre protection systemsa b s t r a c t
Stage ﬁre protection measures, details differing from one region to another, have been
established, codiﬁed and enforced throughout the world and have changed little over the
past 100 years. Technological advancements in both stagecraft and ﬁre protection systems
have led to a need in the theater community to study the current state of theater ﬁre
protection requirements. The objective of the study was to assess the level of protection
afforded by stage active ﬁre protection measures, as prescribed by the International Build-
ing Code (IBC) (2009), NFPA 80 Standard for Fire Doors and Other Opening Protectives
(2007) and as implemented in current design practice, in the event of a ﬁre in the stage-
house of a proscenium theater. The study presented herein assesses the effectiveness of
each of the ﬁre protection systems required by building codes for proscenium type the-
aters. The egress study is not part of this study and thus not speciﬁcally carried out.
Computational ﬂuid dynamics (CFD) has been utilized to examine ﬁre conditions and to
assess the effectiveness of the ﬁre protection systems provided within a stage. The input
data including representative theater dimensions, fuel loads, and ﬁre scenarios have been
determined by a survey of theater design professionals.
 2014 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-
NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).Introduction
Stage ﬁre protection measures, details differing from one region to another, have been established, codiﬁed and enforced
throughout the world and have changed little over the past 100 years. Technological advancements in both stagecraft and
ﬁre protection systems have led to a need in the theater community to study the current state of theater ﬁre protection
requirements. The objective of the study was to assess the level of protection afforded by stage active ﬁre protection mea-
sures, as prescribed by the International Building Code (IBC) [1], NFPA 80 Standard for Fire Doors and Other Opening Protectives
[2] and as implemented in current design practice, in the event of a ﬁre in the stagehouse of a proscenium theater. This study
consists of two parts. Part I identiﬁed (1) the magnitude of ﬁre necessary to activate the automatic ﬁre protection systems
including rate-of-rise heat detectors, sprinklers, ﬁre curtain, and roof vents and (2) the activation order of the ﬁre protection
systems, which was published through the Fire Protection Research Foundation (FPRF) [3]. Part II presented herein assesses
the effectiveness of each of the ﬁre protection systems required by building codes for proscenium type theaters. It is noted
that although an egress analysis is not part of this study, it could be part of a ﬁre engineering analysis for any new theater
design in order to compare Available Safety Egress Time (ASET) to Required Safety Egress Time (RSET).
Computational ﬂuid dynamics (CFD) has been utilized to examine ﬁre conditions and to assess the effectiveness of the ﬁre
protection systems provided within a stage. The input data including representative theater dimensions, fuel loads, and ﬁre
scenarios have been determined by a survey of theater design professionals.
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model, Fire Dynamic Simulator (FDS) [4] that has been optimized for use in simulating the effects of ﬁre. FDS solves numer-
ically a form of the Navier–Stokes equations for low speed, thermally driven ﬂows. FDS V5.2.4 was utilized for this study.
Prescriptive code requirements
The following highlights the requirements in the International Building Code with regard to stage protection and stage
ventilation as it is of primary concern to this study. The IBC is the most frequently referenced source for local municipality
building codes in the U.S.
Proscenium wall opening protection
The requirements with regard to proscenium wall openings for stages with a height greater than 15.24 m are as follows:
 A ﬁre curtain or water curtain is to be provided to contain smoke/ﬁre within the stage. The ﬁre curtain is required to be
designed and installed to prevent a glow from a ﬁre being visible to the audience.
 The curtain is required to be activated by rate-of-rise heat detectors operating at a temperature rise of 9–11 C per minute
and by manual operation.
 The curtain is to close the proscenium opening completely within 30 s from the operation of the release mechanism.
 Smoke developed rating for a ﬁre curtain is to be 25 or less in accordance with ASTM E84 [5].
 No smoke and ﬁre is to be spread through the curtain for 30 min tested in accordance with ASTM E119 [6].
Sprinklers
Sprinklers are required to be provided under a roof and a gridiron. If catwalks and galleries over the stage are more than
1.2 m in width, the sprinklers must be provided under all catwalks and galleries over the stage. It is noted that these require-
ments are not required for the stages in which the stage area is 93 m2 or less, the stage height is 15.24 m or less, and curtains,
scenery, or other combustible hangings are not retractable vertically.
Stage ventilation
The requirements with regard to stage ventilation for stages greater than 15.24 m in height or larger in area than 93 m2
are as follows:
Natural means of exhaust
 Two or more roof vents are required to be provided;
 Aggregate clear area of the openings is to be no less than 5% of the stage area;
 Vents are required to be located near the center and above the highest part of the stage area;
 The vents are to be activated by heat-activated devices and by manual means.
Or,
Mechanical means of exhaust
 A mechanical exhaust system is to be activated by the operation of sprinkler system protecting the stage and manual
means that are readily accessible to the ﬁre department.
 A smoke layer must be maintained at greater than 1.83 m above the highest level of the seating or maintained above the
top of the proscenium opening.
Fire modeling input
Geometry
It was decided that the models would need to be representative of theaters being built today, with currently mandated
code requirements as the goal was to look at the performance of modern, current ﬁre protection systems. For quality and
relevant data, the assistance was provided from both American Society of Theater Consultants (ESTA) members and the the-
ater consulting community through an online survey which gathered dimensional criteria for three theater models – small,
medium and large – which is summarized in the table below. Thirty ﬁve responses were returned, the results compiled and
averaged, and the data turned into plans and sections. Based on these, the geometry of the CFD models was built.
J. Kwon / Case Studies in Fire Safety 2 (2014) 9–15 11DimensionFig. 1. Illustration of the impleSmallmentation of a ﬁre safety curtain in thMediume model (plan view).LargeProscenium height [m] 5.56 6.25 11.27
Proscenium width [m] 10.66 12.34 15.24
Stage width [m] 19.35 20.75 34.52
Stage depth [m] 8.68 11.88 14.70
Rigging height [m] 12.65 18.05 29.26
Grid height [m] n/a 15.92 27.12
Flytower height [m] 13.03 19.27 30.48
Auditorium width [m] 18.67 21.49 30.17
Auditorium depth [m] 20.11 29.41 38.17
Seat count [seats] 420 780 1950And then the survey asked respondents to rank the most likely location for the ﬁre and materials involved in the conﬂa-
gration, based on each individual’s experience or knowledge. Several Technical Directors around the U.S. offered material
lists from recent shows in their proscenium theaters. Rationalizing the responses, three locations for the ﬁre were proposed:
(1) center stage at ﬂoor level, (2) center stage approximately 7.6 m above the stage involving ﬂown scenery, and (3) in the
stage wings at stage level. Based on the survey results, it was determined that of the common materials on stage including
muslin, wood, plywood, vinyl, medium-density-ﬁberboard (MDF), masonite, (cardboard) sonotubes, velour and wool
draperies etc., a 75% to 25% mass weighted mixture of natural and synthetic materials respectively, was appropriate and rep-
resentative of sensible ‘‘scenery stuff’’, which was used for the fuel properties in the CFD models. These average values are as
follows:
 Heat of Combustion (DHc): 15,630 [kJ/kg]
 Soot yield: 0.0356 [kg/kg]
 Carbon monoxide yield: 0.021 [kg/kg]
 Radiative fraction: 0.35 []
Grid resolution
Prior to modeling, a calibration study was done to determine the optimal cell size and approximate calculation accuracy.
A series of models were set up to recreate the results from set of ﬁre tests that were conducted previously by Underwriters
Laboratories on the interaction of sprinklers, smoke vents and draft curtains [6]. From the grid resolution study, a 0.2 m grid
size was selected, and its percentage error in predicting ﬁrst sprinkler activation time was approximately 5%. According to
available information, the ﬁre safety curtain will not block airﬂow between the auditorium and the stage completely. To
resolve the ﬂows around the ﬁre safety curtain at the top and the sides within the smoke pocket, 0.025 m  0.05 m grid cells
Fig. 2. Cross sectional view of a ﬁre safety curtain (A–A0 shown in Fig. 1) after a completion of deployment.
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(see Figs. 1 and 2).Fire scenarios
Two ﬁre locations have been determined to examine the sensitivity of the ﬁre safety measures effectiveness to variations
in ﬁre size and/or location: (1) a ﬁre occurring in the center of the stage, and (2) a rigging ﬁre originating in the ﬂown scenery
above the stage. Two ﬁre locations was selected based on information gathered in the survey of theater industry profession-
als and the results from the Part I study [3]. From a risk perspective, the two scenarios could be considered to be the higher
magnitude or impact event (center stage ﬁre) and the most probable or frequent type of event (rigging ﬁre).
In addition to the location of the ﬁres, the models were parameterized to explore relative impact of each of the provided
stage ﬁre safety measures. The baseline performance of the required systems is established in models that assume all ﬁre
safety measures operate and/or deploy as intended by design. Subsequent models consider the omission or failure to activate
or deploy of each ﬁre safety measure independently. The approach allows positive contributions of each measure to be qual-
iﬁed for ranking purposes in achieving ﬁre and life safety goals.
 Scenario 1 assumes all automatic ﬁre safety measures – sprinklers, ﬁre safety curtain, and stage roof vents – are func-
tional and operate when predicted to do so. Stage vents open upon actuation of fusible links located directly below
the vents. Fire growth is halted upon sprinkler actuation and maintained constant in magnitude henceforth.
 Scenario 2 assumes all automatic ﬁre safety measures, except for the ﬁre safety curtain, are functional and operate when
predicted. Stage vents open upon actuation of fusible links located directly below the vent. Fire growth is halted upon
sprinkler actuation and maintained constant in magnitude henceforth.
 Scenario 3 assumes all automatic ﬁre safety measures, except for the roof vents, are functional and operate when pre-
dicted to do so. Fire growth is halted upon sprinkler actuation and maintained constant in magnitude henceforth.
 Scenario 4 assumes all automatic ﬁre safety measures, except for the sprinklers, are functional and operate when pre-
dicted to do so. Stage vents open upon actuation of fusible links located directly below the vents. Fire growth continues
unabated at the assumed fast growth rate throughout duration of the simulation of 600 s (approximately 16.9 MW at
600 s).
 Scenario 5 assumes all automatic ﬁre safety measures are functional and operate when predicted to do so. Stage vents are
opened by means of rate-of-rise heat detectors in lieu of fusible links. Fire growth is halted upon sprinkler actuation and
maintained constant in magnitude henceforth.
Table 1
Material thermal properties used in model.
Item Concrete [7] Yellow pine [8]
Speciﬁc heat (kJ/kg/K) 1.04 2.85
Conductivity (W/m/K) 1.80 0.14
Density (kg/m3) 2280 640
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scenarios for the two selected ﬁre locations were simulated within each of three theater sizes; designated small, medium,
and large. It was found during Part I of this study that detection times of center stage ﬁres within the ‘‘large’’ theater were
in excess of the total simulation time of 600 s. Accordingly, no additional center ﬁre scenarios were simulated within the
large theater during the Part II study.
Growing ﬁre model
A stage typically contains a considerable amount of fuel, but a fuel load and fuel arrangements vary from one theater to
another and/or from one production to another, which made difﬁcult to generalize a ﬁre curve. It was therefore assumed that
the heat release rate follows a fast t-squared growth curve and assumed that a ﬁre growth is halted at the time of sprinkler
activation and a constant heat release rate is maintained thereafter.
The ﬁre area is modeled to increase incrementally as the heat release rate increases in magnitude until the sprinklers acti-
vate. This technique is applied differently to each of the ﬁre locations as the relevant geometry to each scenario is unique [3].
Thermal boundary conditions
For conductive heat transfer calculations, the material properties of concrete were assigned to the ceilings, walls, and
ﬂoors and yellow pine for the scenery. The material properties for each material are shown in Table 1.
Instrumentation
A series of ‘‘sensors’’ measuring temperatures and velocities were placed in each model to represent sprinklers, heat
detectors and fusible links that are required by the code. This allows each measurement point to be analyzed as a fusible
link, a heat detector, or a sprinkler, thereby providing the following beneﬁts:
 The response times with the various parameter values such as RTI, conductive loss factor, and activation temperature can
be obtained without inserting duplicate sprinkler/heat detector devices at each location.
 Other device response times that are not incorporated in FDS (i.e., rate-of-rise heat detectors) can be estimated.
Sprinklers were located at grid level and ceiling level with an activation temperature of 74 C in accordance with NFPA 13
[9]. Rate of rise detectors were located (1) on the proscenium wall above the proscenium opening, 0.15 m below the ceiling
(usual practice in the U.S.) and (2) on the ceiling just upstage of the proscenium opening. ‘‘Fusible links’’ were located every
3 m along the safety curtain release line at a slightly higher resolution than that required by NFPA 80 (one every 4.5 m) and
at the hatches for roof venting.
The results
The key results of Part II are provided below. It is noted that the following results are based on the scenarios and inputs
considered herein.
 The visibility contours from the vent failure model and the sprinkler failure model are shown in Figs. 3 and 4. This show
the operation of the roof vents is most critical in providing a safe environment in the auditorium for egress of the theater
occupants/patrons.
 Fig. 4 shows that a ﬁre safety curtain alone is inadequate to stop smoke from spreading to the auditorium completely,
although the ﬁre curtain restricts air movement reducing the rate of smoke spread to the auditorium.
 The ﬁre safety curtain and roof vents are ﬁre and life safety systems that are intended to work in tandem. Alternate
strategies that employ only ventilation or stage exhaust in lieu of a ﬁre safety curtain require a thorough analysis to
be completed to establish acceptable fuel loads and ﬁre sizes. Such an approach would also likely call for a detailed fuel
management program that might in turn reduce the ﬂexibility in theatrical use of the space. As scenic elements/arrange-
ments are changed, such spaces should require special analysis for each production as to whether the modiﬁed
arrangement would produce smoke/ﬁre exceeding the capacity of a smoke control system provided.
Fig. 3. Visibility contour in the case of the roof vent failure taken 1.8 m above the highest walking surface in the auditorium at 600 s (center stage ﬁre –
medium theater).
Fig. 4. Visibility contour in the case of the sprinkler failure taken 1.8 m above the highest walking surface in the auditorium at 600 s (center stage ﬁre –
medium theater).
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of a life safety provided the ﬁre safety curtain and/or roof vents are designed properly and actuated rapidly to preclude
smoke spread to the auditorium.
 Activation of the roof vents and the ﬁre curtain by rate-of-rise heat detectors provides the most rapid means for system
deployment (notwithstanding manual operation) thereby increasing the likelihood of maintaining a tenable environment
within the auditorium regardless of the presence or successful operation of sprinklers.
 The results show that the late activation of the roof vents may result in unsafe conditions for egress in the auditorium.
This indicates that the roof vents need to be activated as early as possible by the rate-of-rise heat detectors and/or by
a means of manual activation.
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sprinkler, while sprinkler activation precedes roof vent activation by fusible link due to its mass of thermal element.
 While the activation of sprinklers seem less critical compared to the effective operation of the roof vents and ﬁre safety
curtain for the maintenance of a tenable environment within the auditorium, sprinklers are key to limiting the ultimate
magnitude of the ﬁre, protecting the integrity of the structure, and limiting property damage and losses.
 During the simulated time, no automatic means of ﬁre protection systems were activated in the ﬁre occurred in the center
of a stage in the large-sized theater, indicating human intervention and manual activation of stage ﬁre safety systems
become increasingly important as the size of the theater increases. Theaters falling into the ‘‘large’’ classiﬁcation require
special consideration because of the potential delays in system activation owing to the height of the stage.
 The sprinkler activation times were not much sensitive to the scenarios modeled in this study, except for Scenario 5. The
sprinkler activation in Scenario 5 was generally delayed (30–60% more in the activation time). It is deemed that the early
activation of all smoke vents by rate-of-rise heat detectors played a role in this. The values in the table below are based on
the results from Scenario 1 through Scenario 4.Fire location On the center of a stage In ﬂown sceneryTheater size Small Medium Large⁄ Small Medium LargeFire size at the sprinkler activation (MW) 2 5.6 N/A 0.8 2.4 2.8⁄Not activated due to a high ﬂytower height and a plume disruption by scenery above a ﬁre.
 Rate of rise heat detectors on ceiling activates quicker than those on proscenium wall. Based on this result, NFPA 80 2013
edition speciﬁcally states that rate of rise heat detectors are to be located at the ceiling.
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